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China has achieved remarkable economic success since initiating the reform and opening-up policies in
1978. However, as the reform of economic institutions, power decentralization, privatization and opening-
up policies progress, corrupt activities such as embezzlement, bribery, kickbacks, power-for-money deals
and seeking private ends in public causes have also increased in most public sectors. It is estimated that about
4–8% of GNP is depleted by corruption (Hu and Guo, 2001; Gong, 2010). Corruption is a diﬃcult problem
that hampers economic development, political democracy and social harmony in China (Zhou and Tao, 2009;
Gong, 2010). Many studies on the determinants of and factors aﬀecting corruption ﬁnd that corruption is
always related to discretional power, incomplete or weak legal institutions and inadequate supervision (Zhou
and Tao, 2009; Gong, 2010). Among others, the public ﬁnance sector is particularly open to corruption
because it is granted many ﬁnancial power advantages in terms of taxation, budgeting, government procure-
ment and the management of state assets.
Government auditing, the fundamental purpose of which is to monitor, ensure and appraise the account-
ability of government, is an important institutional arrangement in modern government governance. By mon-
itoring the operation of public power, especially how public resources are used, government auditing can
strengthen accountability and reduce the abuse of power and resources. The governance practices of many
countries also indicate that government auditing can play a unique role in curbing corruption. On the one
hand, auditors are experts in detecting fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting, which makes them eﬀective in investi-
gating the underlying corruption. On the other hand, the deterrent eﬀect of government auditing can be inten-
siﬁed by making auditing results known to the public and holding the individual bureaucrats who are
concerned responsible (Hu, 2005; Gong, 2010). If corruption is a “virus” that harms economic security and
social harmony, then the government auditing system is supposed to be the “immune system” that detects,
resists and weeds out the virus.
The governance role of auditing and the determinants andmotivations of corruption are discussed separately
in many studies. However, research on corruption mainly focuses on power-for-money deals and bribery in eco-
nomic and banking areas, while little attention is given to corruption in public ﬁnance (Li and Zhuang, 2009).
Meanwhile, studies on how to curtail corruption seldom pay speciﬁc attention to the role of auditing. Con-
versely, the literature on government auditing primarily focuses on the independence, professionalism and audit-
ing input of government auditing agencies and how these factors aﬀect the reputation and eﬃciency of
government departments (Raman and Wilson, 1994; Saito and Mcintosh, 2010, etc.). Only a few studies touch
upon the relationship between government auditing and corruption (Blume and Voigt, 2011; Olken, 2007).
However, none of these studies answer the question of how government auditing may help to curb corruption.
Unlike that in developed countries in Europe and North America, government auditing in China is part of
the governance institution and is characterized by strong administrative properties. Nevertheless, there is little
evidence on whether China’s audit system plays a diﬀerent role from its counterparts in western countries. As a
part of the overall government administration regime, China’s government auditing system undoubtedly has
some administrative power. To be speciﬁc, government audit institutions in China are not only supposed to
detect and report1 irregularities and violations that may exist in government accounts and statements, they are
also authorized with the power to impose administrative sanctions and penalties on the responsible agencies
and individuals who violate the laws and regulations. They must also ensure that all irregularities are corrected
and all violations are punished accordingly. Even though China is a big country with multi-tier administrative
units, local government plays a crucial role in the country’s economic and social development and is undoubt-
edly controlling a certain portion of government resources. According to statistics, the US federal government
owns the control rights on about two-thirds of the nation’s government funds, whereas in China, public expen-
diture at the local level accounts for more than two-thirds of all public spending.2 What’s more, due to China’s1 Here, “report” means to report the audit results to leading government oﬃcials, the higher audit institution and other related
departments. Audit results at the local level, especially the municipal and county level, are not always disclosed publicly in the sample
period.
2 For example, local ﬁscal expenditure accounts for 68.5% of China’s whole ﬁscal expenditure in 1999 and 78.7% in 2008. Data is from
the China Economic Information Network Database (http://db.cei.gov.cn/).
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power over public revenue and expenditure. Therefore, supervising how local government oﬃcials are using
their power and how public money is managed is vital and urgent, yet there are few studies and little evidence
on the governance role of China’s local audit institutions.
Building on the literature and taking China’s special institutional setting into consideration, this paper ten-
tatively explores the rectiﬁcation and prevention role of China’s local audit institutions in addition to its dis-
covery role against irregular and corrupt behavior. We demonstrate empirically that China’s government
auditing has worked actively and eﬀectively in discovering irregularities and preventing corruption, and there-
fore can help to improve government accountability and transparency. To be speciﬁc, this study employs a
sample of local government audit institutions in China’s 31 provincial administrations from 1999 to 2008.
Taking corruption cases committed by public oﬃcials and ﬁled by the judicial organs in each province as a
measure of the severity of corruption, we empirically examine the role of government auditing in the ﬁght
against corruption from two perspectives: the fraud detection eﬀort in government auditing and the rectiﬁca-
tion eﬀort after audits. Our main ﬁndings indicate that: (1) local audit institutions can detect and report vio-
lations and misbehavior in the income and expenditure of government funds, and the number of violations
and irregularities is positively related to the intensity of bureaucratic corruption in that province. However,
the detection and reporting of violation and irregularities does not signiﬁcantly decrease corruption; and
(2) the implementation of sanctions, penalties and other audit decisions has a deterrent eﬀect on the audited
bodies, which indicates that increasing rectiﬁcation eﬀort in the present period will result in less corruption in
the following period.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, based on the supervision and appraisal role
of government auditing, we carefully examine the relationship between the fraud detection eﬀort of govern-
ment auditing and the degree of corruption in each province, and provide empirical evidence on the revealing
role of government auditing. Then, focusing on the speciﬁc properties of China’s government auditing system,
we tentatively examine whether the post-audit rectiﬁcation eﬀort can strengthen the deterrence power of gov-
ernment auditing and empirically demonstrate that rectiﬁcation results are negatively related to the degree of
corruption in the lagged period. Finally, unlike previous studies on corruption that pay little attention to audit
institutions and previous discussions on the role of government auditing in curbing corruption that lack
empirical support, our research provides direct evidence on the role of government auditing in the ﬁght against
corruption. Our research not only enriches the literature in these two areas, but also provides some far-reach-
ing implications for China’s government auditing practice and corruption control initiatives.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on government auditing
and corruption. Section 3 discusses the institutional background, theoretical analysis and research hypotheses.
Section 4 describes the sample, data and variables. Sections 5 and 6 present the empirical analysis on the rela-
tionship between government auditing and corruption. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
2.1. Government auditing
Classic audit theory states that audit quality is the probability that the auditor will both discover and report
a breach in the client’s accounting system (DeAngelo, 1981). When it comes to government audit, Zhao (2005)
proposes a fairly complete characteristic framework that divides the factors related to the quality of govern-
ment audit into three categories: technical factors (professional competence, auditor size and audit hours),
independence factors (audit fee, auditor reputation and the organizational design of audit institutions) and
administrative factors (determining the nature of irregularities, making the right decisions and checking on
rectiﬁcation results). Of these, administrative factors are unique under the special setting in China. In
empirical studies, researchers often use one aspect of these characteristics as a proxy measurement of govern-
ment audit quality. For example, Saito and Mcintosh (2010) employ time spent in auditing as a direct measure
of auditing eﬀort. Ma (2007) reports that educational background, experience and professional competence
are signiﬁcantly related to the ﬁnancial eﬃciency of government auditing. Blume and Voigt (2011) document
that the mandate, independence and institutional environment of the state supreme audit institutions can exert
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quency of power alternation aﬀect the independence of the audit bodies and thus are signiﬁcantly related to
the activism and autonomy of the latter. Considering China’s special setting, Huang and Wang (2010) and Wei
et al. (2010) argue that the “correction” or “rectiﬁcation” eﬀort made by the audit institutions and related par-
ties after problems are recognized is the most important factor in determining the extent to which government
auditing can perform its duties and promote government transparency and accountability.
Numerous studies have also been conducted on the economic consequences of government auditing. Many
researchers discuss the important role that government auditing plays in the public sector. For example,
Raman and Wilson (1994) ﬁnd that government auditing procurement practices aﬀect the price of seasoned
municipal bonds. Saito and Mcintosh (2010) examine audit eﬃciency in public school operations and docu-
ment that state auditors can enhance eﬃciency in the use of school resources. Both Schelker and Eichenberger
(2010) and Blume and Voigt (2011) indicate that government auditing can improve the transparency of public
policies and reduce wasteful spending. Olken (2007) conducted a ﬁeld experiment on the monitoring eﬀect of
government auditing in Indonesia and documents that when the probability of village road projects being
audited by government increased from 4% to 100%, corruption (over-spending) on these projects decreased
by 8%. Similarly, Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2010) ﬁnd that government auditing reports can reveal corrupt
activities, which then aﬀect political election results. Several studies have explored the eﬀectiveness and eﬃ-
ciency of government auditing in China. For instance, Wei et al. (2010) discuss how sanctions and penalties,
the transferring of cases and clues and the submission of audit reports and newsletters aﬀect the operational
security of public ﬁnancial funds. Li et al. (2011) examine whether government auditing, especially economic
accountability auditing, can prevent government oﬃcials and CPC party members from corruption.
Previous studies on government auditing conducted in both China and internationally are useful in under-
standing the role of government auditing in government governance, including the establishment of public
accountability, control of corruption and promotion of government eﬃciency. Building on these studies,
we argue that government auditing results should be read and explained dialectically. Although the irregular
or illegal activities detected in government auditing to some extent reﬂect audit eﬀort or quality, they are basi-
cally a reﬂection of the irregularities or corruption problems in the public ﬁnancial sector. Therefore, we inves-
tigate both the relation between irregularities detected in government audits and provincial corruption, and
the relation between rectiﬁcation eﬀort and provincial corruption. This paper not only answers whether gov-
ernment auditing can prevent or reduce corruption, but also provides empirical evidence that the rectiﬁcation
eﬀort following an audit is critical to guaranteeing the power of government auditing. Government auditing
can only act as a strong deterrent to corrupt activities if adequate eﬀort is made to rectify malpractice in the
collection and spending of government funds and by ensuring that all audit decisions and suggestions are car-
ried out completely. Otherwise, government auditing will be worthless.
2.2. Corruption
Corruption is a signiﬁcant problem that harms the economic development and social stability of many
countries. Consequently, studies on the roots and consequences of corruption and its counter-strategies are
hot economic, management and social topics. From an economic point of view, corruption is rooted in the
existence of privileges and incomplete market mechanisms. Privileges are always accompanied by government
regulation. The government’s broad intervention in economic activities and multi-tier approval procedures
provides enormous opportunities for rent-seeking (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Sun et al., 2005). Adit (2003)
identiﬁes three necessary conditions for corruption to arise and persist: discretionary power, economic rents,
and weak institutions. While the arbitrary nature of power makes rent-seeking possible, the lack of a strong
institution makes public oﬃcers with supreme authority fearless in extracting and creating rents. Although
corruption may be eﬃcient under some extreme conditions,3 there is ample evidence to suggest that it is extre-
mely harmful. The direct consequences of corruption are the wasting of resources, low eﬃciency in resource
allocation, reduced investment and low economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Yang and Zhao, 2004).3 Adit (2003) quotes the example suggested by Leﬀ (1964), that corrupt bureaucracies to some extent solved the inﬂation problems in
Chile and Brazil in the early 1960s.
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construction projects and decrease spending on science, education, culture and health programs, because it is
easier to extract from construction projects (Mauro, 1998; Wu and Yao, 2008). In addition, corruption rep-
resents a form of income redistribution without transparency, which increases the gap between the rich and
poor, and is certainly against social fairness and justice (Chen and Li, 2010). In summary, corruption distorts
the functions of government and market mechanisms. It makes it diﬃcult to build economic order, slows
down economic development and harms social stability.
As the increase in corruption has profound institutional roots, the proposed counter-strategies inevitably
include institutional reform. Sun et al. (2005) point out that an eﬀective way to ﬁght corruption is market con-
struction. Once a more perfect and complete market is built, there will be less space for rent-seeking. Cheng
and Sun (2006) conclude that Pinochet’s economic reforms in the 1970s successfully got Chile out of the quag-
mire of corruption. The reforms reduced government intervention and increased reliance on the market to
allocate resources. Besides market construction, another important anti-corruption strategy is to increase
supervision, which relies heavily on a country’s special supervisory systems, particularly the judiciary system
and audit system. However, special supervisory systems are also easy to corrupt, so the eﬀectiveness of super-
vision depends largely on the independence of the professional supervisory agencies (Svensson, 2005). Paying
higher wages to public oﬃcials is another widely used anti-corruption strategy. More competitive pay will
encourage public oﬃcials to value their reputation and hesitate before becoming involved in illegal activities
(Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003). Recently, there has been an increasing realization that improving informa-
tion disclosure and giving citizens greater rights to decisions can be eﬀective in reducing corruption. For exam-
ple, Reinikka and Svensson (2005) report that since the Ugandan central government started publishing
newspaper accounts of the education funds allocated to primary schools, the local capture of education funds
has reduced signiﬁcantly and student enrollment and learning have improved considerably. Yet public
enforcement or monitoring may also cause free-riding problems and can be easily manipulated by the elites
(Olken, 2007). Comprehensive strategies that combine market construction, stronger supervision by the judi-
ciary and audit systems, and open budget reform and transparent decision-making are widely applied in the
battle against corruption in many places across the world.
A government auditing system is an indispensible part of the whole political and economic institution, and
its fundamental goal is to supervise and check the balance of public power. Government auditing is supposed
to be an active force in the global anti-corruption campaign, yet previous studies provide little empirical evi-
dence on the relationship between government auditing and corruption control. Unlike numerous studies that
seek fundamental institutional reform and market improvement to curtail corruption, this paper tentatively
examines one of the professional accountability mechanisms: the government auditing system for special
concerns.3. Institutional background and theoretical analysis
3.1. Institutional background
China’s current government auditing system was developed in the early 1980s. Until then, the supervision
of public power and bureaucracies mainly depended on the internal supervision of the Party and the personal
loyalty of public oﬃcers, and the role of audit was politically and administratively marginalized (Gong, 2009).
The China National Auditing Oﬃce (CNAO) was founded in 1983, followed by the establishment of its res-
ident oﬃces in state ministries and commissions and in certain regions, with corresponding audit institutions
at provincial, municipal, and county levels. The CNAO, together with its resident oﬃces and corresponding
local institutions, formed a structured multi-tier government auditing system with wide coverage. In the 1990s,
government auditing work was further legalized and standardized with the successive promulgation of the
Audit Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Regulations for the Implementation of the Audit Law of the
People’s Republic of China and a series of auditing standards and other regulations. However, it was the “audit
storm” sparked by the announcement of audit results to the public in 2003 that made government auditing
widely known to the public in China and around the world. The role of government auditing in “detecting
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20 years of development, China’s government audit institutions have become one of the most important insti-
tutional arrangements for supervising the use of government funds, maintaining national ﬁscal and economic
order, and promoting government transparency and accountability.
Along with continuous improvements in government auditing, a theory of audit systems and core values of
audit institutions have also developed. Before the introduction of the Audit Law and the Regulations for the
Implementation of Audit Law, the legal framework of government auditing was neither complete nor perfect
and the core missions of the audit were unclear. Thus, for a long time government audit institutions mainly
acted as ﬁnancial supervision agencies. The ﬁnancial and economic supervision function of government audit-
ing was only truly established after the promulgation of these two laws and regulations. Former General Audi-
tor Li Jinhua pointed out that the essence of government auditing is “a tool that promotes democracy and the
rule of law,” and put forward the concept that an audit is the “watchdog” of state property. The present Gen-
eral Auditor Liu Jiayi inherited the idea that auditing should promote democracy and the rule of law, and
further proposed that beyond acting like a “watchdog,” audit institutions should be the “immune system” that
safeguards the security of the entire social, economic and ﬁnancial system. As an “immune system,” govern-
ment auditing should be sensitive to all risks and “viruses” that may hinder economic and social development.
Both the “watchdog” theory and the “immune system” theory stress the detecting, revealing and resistance
functions of the government auditing system, but the “immune system” theory places more emphasis on
the prevention and restoration role than on the detection of irregularities.
Unlike developed Western countries, China adopts an executive mode of government auditing. According
to China’s Constitution and Audit Law, audit institutions exercise supervision through auditing of government
departments, state-owned monetary institutions, enterprises and other institutions, but the audit system itself
is a part of the executive branch of the state, which means the supervisor and the supervisee are not fully inde-
pendent of each other. At the state level, the CNAO is directly under the leadership of the Premier, whereas
the local audit institutions are under the dual leadership of the administrative heads of their corresponding-
level governments and the audit institutions at the next-highest level. When their work is mainly directed by
the next-highest audit institution, personnel aﬀairs and audit funds are decided by the corresponding govern-
ment, which makes local audit institutions even less independent (Zheng and Yin, 2010). However, China’s
government audit system also has some very special and important properties: besides carrying out investiga-
tions and making recommendations, the audit institutions are authorized to impose administrative sanctions
and penalties4 on the audited bodies, check on rectiﬁcation results and force audited bodies to make suﬃcient
rectiﬁcations. Thanks to these special properties, the functions of the government audit institutions in China
are not limited to fraud detecting and reporting, but include rectiﬁcation of any irregular or illegal acts in eco-
nomic and ﬁscal operations (Feng, 2005; Zhao, 2005).
Corruption has become a huge problem that concerns many countries worldwide. The key to combating
corruption is to eliminate privileges and strengthen government accountability. Therefore, many countries
and organizations have put forward government audit institutions in the battle against corruption. For exam-
ple, the USA introduced a Government Accountability Oﬃce (GAO) and Brazil established audit courts. Chi-
na’s government auditing system has a unique arrangement that diﬀers from its counterparts in developed
western countries. Furthermore, China’s local audit institutions diﬀer from the CNAO in many ways.
Although a few empirical studies have examined the role of government auditing, few people are aware of
the role of China’s local audit institutions. As China’s local governments are very important in China’s polit-
ical and economic system and corruption in local government is so severe, it is important to explore the role of
local audit institutions in the war against corruption at the local level.4 According to article 41 of the Audit Law of the People’s Republic of China, “Where violations of State regulations governing
government and ﬁnancial revenues and expenditures should be dealt with or punished in accordance with law, it shall, within the limits of
its statutory functions and powers, make an audit decision or put forward to the department in charge its suggestions as to how to deal
with or punish the violations.” Article 45 further speciﬁes the measures that should be taken, including ordering the audited units to turn
over what should be turned over and returning their illegally possessed state-owned assets and unlawful gains, to deal with the matters
concerned in accordance with the uniform regulations of the state governing the accounting system and to take other measures.
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3.2.1. Detection of irregularities and exposure of corruption
The most important function of government auditing is to determine whether the process of collecting and
spending public funds and other relevant transactions is in line with state laws and regulations, to determine
whether there is any misbehavior in the management of public revenue and expenditure, and to disclose any
irregularity that harms government accountability in the audit report. According to China’s Audit Law, audit
institutions should supervise by auditing the authenticity, lawfulness and eﬃciency of the government, or the
ﬁnancial revenues and expenditures of the audited bodies, among which the supervision of authenticity and
lawfulness is the basis for the supervision of eﬃciency. Meanwhile, as the criteria for evaluating the eﬃciency
of government or ﬁnancial revenue and expenditure have not yet been developed, for the past twenty years or
more, government auditing in China has been concerned mainly with the supervision of authenticity and law-
fulness. As shown in the audit reports that have been publicized in recent years, local audit institutions can
discover and expose misbehavior that violates laws and regulations, are against standards and guidelines,
or waste resources.
Corruption is the misuse of public oﬃce for private gain. Misuse always involves comparison with a legal
standard. Typical corruption includes the illegal sale of government property, kickbacks in government pro-
curement and bribery and embezzlement of government funds (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Svensson, 2005).
Due to the secretive nature of corruption and the various forms it takes, to control corruption professional
agencies ﬁrst need to identify and discover corrupt activities. Government auditors are proﬁcient at detecting
fraud in ﬁnancial statements and the misuse of government properties and are therefore determined to work
actively in detecting corruption (Gong, 2010). The number of irregularities found in government auditing to
some extent reﬂects whether audit institutions are diligent in fraud detection, but more importantly, it reﬂects
how public resources are misused by government sectors and related departments. Some researchers have used
the misbehavior detected in government auditing to measure the diligence or eﬀort of audit institutions (Ma,
2007; Li et al., 2011), but other researchers treat it as a direct measure of corruption (Melo et al., 2009; Pereira
et al., 2009; Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011). When audit institutions are highly independent and the audit work
is highly technical and impartial, irregularities or violation cases reported by audit institutions can be used as a
good measure of government corruption (Melo et al., 2009; Ferraz and Finan, 2011). However, in this paper,
we do not equate the irregularities found by audit institutions to corruption. Instead, following previous lit-
erature (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Zhou and Tao, 2009; Wu and Rui, 2010), we apply corruption cases com-
mitted by public oﬃcials in each province to measure the severity of corruption. On the one hand, the
audit institutions are not fully independent from the executive branch in China and corruption investigation
is not the primary goal of government auditing. On the other hand, according to audit reports and other data,
the problems found by government audit institutions are always conducted by a department, which diﬀers
from corruption cases committed by individual public oﬃcials. However, the close relationship between irreg-
ularities found by audit agencies and corruption cases ﬁled by judicial organs in the same place is also unde-
niable. Generally, corruption cases and irregularities both reﬂect the quality of government governance. In a
place with severe corruption, there is likely to be more irregular or illegal activities that are traceable in gov-
ernment ﬁnancial accounts and statements, which should be noticed by professional, diligent and responsible
government auditors. Otherwise, if an audit institution cannot discover or report clues and traces left by cor-
rupt bureaucrats, it cannot be regarded as having fulﬁlled its supervising responsibilities. Therefore, we pro-
pose the following hypothesis:
H1. The number of irregularities detected by local audit institutions is positively related to the severity of
corruption of public bureaucrats in a province.3.2.2. Post-audit rectiﬁcation and corruption
The number of irregularities detected in government auditing is a reﬂection of how many violations exist in
government operations. However, an audit report disclosing these irregularities is far from suﬃcient to deter
corrupt bureaucrats and their potential followers. The key to curbing corruption is accountability. That is, to
curb accountability it is important to determine the rights and responsibilities of each government department,
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rights are not exercised in line with the relevant laws and regulations and when the responsibilities are not ful-
ﬁlled accordingly. Therefore, the detection of irregularities in government auditing is only the ﬁrst step and the
second step of “asking for responsibility and making correction” is more important. It is only through the
complete and timely enforcement of audit decisions—sanctions, penalties and suggestions for dealing with
or punishing violations and improving management—that the deterrent eﬀect of government auditing can
be guaranteed. Otherwise, audit decisions will represent a worthless piece of paper and violations and wrong-
doings will occur again and again.
To fulﬁll the mission of a government audit system, there must be an “asking for responsibility” step after
violations and irregularities are identiﬁed by auditors. Klitgaard (1998) proposes a well-known model to
explain the dynamics of corruption: corruption = monopoly power + discretion – accountability. Adit
(2003) also points out that discretionary power, economic rents and weak institutions are the three necessary
conditions for corruption to arise and persist. Both of these views indicate that corruption is rooted in the
excessive power of government departments and public oﬃcials, together with a lack of supervision, whereas
the strengthening of accountability regimes can reduce corruption. Compared with other accountability
regimes, government auditing lays its expertise in the system of checks and balances and fraud detection.
The check and balance of power must ﬁrst determine where the problems are and who is responsible for those
problems. All illicit or irregular acts are traceable in ﬁnancial deals and accounting records. Auditors have
long been familiar with the ﬁnancial system and accounting books, and thus can play a unique role in fraud
detection and corruption control (Gong, 2010). The World Bank considers the national audit oﬃce or the
supreme audit institute as the linchpin of a country’s integrity system, because an audit can help to: (1) curb
corruption and act as a potent deterrent to waste and the abuse of public funds; (2) reinforce the legal, ﬁnan-
cial and institutional framework; (3) establish the predictability of government behavior and law, and reduce
arbitrariness in the application of laws and rules; and (4) expose non-transparent policies against the public
interest (Dye and Stapenhurst, 1998). However, all of the roles supposed to be played by the auditors depend
on a powerful government system with eﬀective accountability mechanisms (Gong, 2010).
China’s government auditing system is essentially “a tool that promotes democracy and the rule of law,”
which aims to improve the transparency and accountability of government by exercising supervision of the
revenues and expenditures of government sectors and other related institutions. Corruption is a chronic cancer
that harms the transparency and accountability of government, and is inevitably the target for audit institu-
tions to dig out, ﬁght against and prevent from happening repeatedly. Compared with developed western
countries, China has both a weak institution and a weak accountability system. However, China’s audit insti-
tutions are authorized to impose administrative sanctions and penalties on audited bodies wherever illegal and
irregular deeds are uncovered. In another words, in addition to detecting and reporting malpractice and mis-
behavior, China’s audit institutions can punish and rectify them. Audit institutions are involved in the recti-
ﬁcation process in several ways. They can: (1) impose sanctions and penalties directly; (2) transfer cases to the
parties in charge and make suggestions on the sanctions and penalties that should be imposed; (3) make sug-
gestions on how to repair deﬁciencies in government administration and how to perfect government institu-
tions; and (4) check on the implementation of audit decisions and the rectiﬁcation results. Rectiﬁcation is
more important than fraud detection and reporting, because it is only by punishing violations and correcting
misbehavior in time that economic and ﬁscal order can be maintained and government transparency can be
achieved. The results of rectiﬁcation measures following an audit can reﬂect the supervisory eﬀectiveness of
government auditing and are essential in determining whether the audit system can reduce corruption. There-
fore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2. The more rectiﬁcation eﬀort made following government auditing, the more eﬀective local audit
institutions will be in reducing corruption.3.2.3. Other factors
3.2.3.1. Factors aﬀecting auditing and rectiﬁcation results. Audit amount is the amount of funds audited by
audit institutions. We use irregularities found in government auditing as a measure of auditors’ detection
eﬀort. However, the number of irregularities is closely related to the total amount of funds audited. Other
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there are to be found. Though the speciﬁc amount audited by each local audit institution is unavailable, we
can use the total amount of ﬁscal revenue and expenditure as a proxy, as the ﬁscal revenue and expenditure
of local governments is the main compulsory object of supervision for audit institutions at the corresponding
level.
Auditor is the most important resource in government auditing. Whether an audit institution can ﬁnish its
tasks with high quality is largely dependent on the number, professional competence and independence of the
auditors (Zhao, 2005; Ma, 2007; Li et al., 2011). Other things being equal, an audit institution with more inde-
pendent and more experienced auditors tends to be more capable of detecting misbehavior, making correct
decisions and providing rectiﬁcation suggestions. However, due to data availability, we can only use the num-
ber of employees of the provincial audit oﬃce as a proxy.
Reports and newsletters delivered by local audit institutions contain summarized information on problems
found in auditing, suggestions for management improvements and solutions for rectiﬁcation, which are infor-
mative and important (Huang and Wang, 2010). When these reports and newsletters are instructed or adopted
by leading government oﬃcials, higher audit institutions or related departments, the auditors who prepared
this information will be encouraged and audited bodies will be under greater pressure to rectify misbehavior
and improve management. Therefore, under the same conditions, a higher adoption rate of reports and news-
letters delivered by local audit institutions may bring about more diligent audit teams and better rectiﬁcation
results.
Financial solvency of local government is another important factor. The post-audit rectiﬁcation results, espe-
cially rectiﬁcations concerning money, are largely dependent on the local government’s ﬁnancial solvency. As
some rectiﬁcation reports state, a major reason that many audited bodies do not carry out rectiﬁcation deci-
sions or do not fulﬁll all rectiﬁcation solutions is a lack of ﬁnancial solvency. Following related literature, we
use provincial revenue per capita and the expenditure–revenue ratio as a proxy for the ﬁnancial solvency of
local government.
3.2.3.2. Factors aﬀecting corruption. Market development is perceived to be the key solution for chronic cor-
ruption problems. The root of corruption lies in the incompleteness and imperfection of markets and the
law. Hence, market development that contains institutional reform and legalization and leads to less govern-
ment intervention in the economy is fundamental to eradicating corruption (Sun et al., 2005; Cheng and Sun,
2006). Zhou and Tao (2009) take the development of a non-public ownership economy as an indicator of mar-
ket development, which is also supported by Wu and Rui (2010). Following previous studies, we predict that
provinces with higher market development will be less corrupt.
Education or human capital has been shown to be an important factor related to corruption. For instance,
Glaeser and Saks (2006) ﬁnd that places with higher education and income are less corrupt. Education and
income status also diﬀer across provinces in China. Following Wu (2010), we use the average number of years
of education beyond the age of 6 to measure the education level in a province.
Wage of public oﬃcials is found to be an important factor aﬀecting bureaucrats’ motivation, there-
fore “high salary for transparency” is an important policy adopted by many countries in preventing cor-
ruption. Referring to Wu and Rui (2010), we use the relative wage of public oﬃcials to capture this
factor.
Size of government is a controversial factor. Fisman and Gatti (2002) ﬁnd that a larger government is
related to less corruption, whereas Ali and Isse (2003) report the opposite. Using provincial data from China,
Wu (2010) ﬁnds a negative relationship between government size and corruption cases, whereas Zhou and Tao
(2009) report a positive relationship. Following this literature, we use the ratio of ﬁscal expenditure to GDP in
each province to measure local government size.
Opennessmeasures the presence of barriers to international trade and capital ﬂows, which may be caused by
collusive behavior between individuals and customs oﬃcials (Gatti, 2004). Some international studies suggest
that countries that are more open tend to be less corrupt. Zhou and Tao (2009) also ﬁnd that provinces with
high imports and exports tend to be less corrupt in China. Therefore, we also control for the level of openness
when examining the determinants of corruption.
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4.1. Sample selection
This paper examines the relationships between irregularities detected in government auditing, post-audit
rectiﬁcation and the severity of public corruption at the provincial level. Our sample period is from 1999 to
2008. As a government audit may have a lagged eﬀect on government corruption, data related to irregularities
detected in and rectiﬁcation taken after government auditing are collected from 1999 to 2008, whereas other
data is from 2000 to 2008. Our sample period starts in 1999 because China’s government auditing system expe-
rienced a long period of development and become relatively standardized and perfected by the late 1990s, and
the Yearbook of Auditing in China began to disclose detailed information about the irregularities, sanctions
and penalties, and rectiﬁcation results of provincial government auditing in 1999. Data related to government
auditing is primarily collected from the Yearbook of Auditing in China and is complemented by internet
searches for missing observations. Other data is from the China Statistical Yearbook and China Economic
Information Network Database.
Table 1 describes the sample selection process and its distribution across the sample period. The original
sample includes 279 observations. However, there are 32 missing observations, thus the ﬁnal sample contains
247 observations. Meanwhile, due to the unavailability of some dates, the sample distribution from 1999 to
2008 is not completely balanced.
4.2. Data description
Table 2 describes the irregularities detected in government auditing, the post-audit rectiﬁcation results and
other related information on government auditing. As shown in Panel A, on average about 4465 government
departments, state-owned monetary institutions, enterprises and other institutions are audited (the auditees)
by the local audit institutions per province-year. An average of about 6 billion RMB (hereafter all RMB) relat-
ing to irregular or illegal activities is detected, which means that on average there are 1.88 million in irregu-
larities found per audited unit per province-year. We make an adjustment for the population size of each
province and ﬁnd that the average amount of irregularities is about 184.15 per capita. The amount of irreg-
ularities accounts for 6.34% of the ﬁnancial revenue and expenditure per province-year, which means that
6.34% of government funds is not collected or expended in accordance with related laws and regulations.
Panel B of Table 2 describes how sanctions and penalties are implemented and how many cases and clues
are transferred to the judicial organs (including the courts and procuratorates), supervisory departments and
other related departments. The table shows that the average amount that should be turned into the treasury,
returned to the original fund channel or deducted from grants or subsidies is about 1948.78 million, whereas
an average of 1119.53 million was actually turned over, returned or deducted. The average rectiﬁcation rate is
about 57.35%. Besides administrative sanctions and penalties, the audit institutions transfer severe cases that
may violate related laws and regulations to related departments. As indicated in the table, on average, 23, 40,Table 1
Sample distribution.
Original data 31 provinces  9 years = 279
Panel A – missing data
Missing data: 32
i. Corruption cases: 9 province-year observations missing
ii. Audit reports, newsletters and their acceptance: 22 province-year observations missing
iii. Public oﬃcials’ relative wage: 2 province-year observations missing
Final sample: 247
Panel B – yearly sample distribution
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Obs. 24 18 29 31 31 27 30 29 28
Table 2
Irregularities detected in government auditing, rectiﬁcation results and other related information.
Item N Mean S.D. Media Min Max
Pane A – irregularities
Irregularities 310 655,965 660,927 458,490 3189 43,08,000
Auditees 310 4465 2664 4736 174 10,527
Irregularities per auditee 310 187.61 200.77 128.69 4.82 1720.32
Irregularities per capita 310 184.15 165.41 127.92 8.34 913.87
Irregularities/(rev. + exp.) 310 6.34% 4.40% 5.59% 1.12% 26.07%
Pane B – sanctions and penalties, rectiﬁcation and clues
Amounts to be turned over 310 194,878 218,759 108,779 3293 19,82,108
To be turned into the treasury 310 102,383 146,182 55,788 1207 14,53,368
Amounts turned over 310 111,953 144,137 61,151 503 985,322
Turned into the treasury 310 69,220 96,451 35,092 217 695,351
Rectiﬁcation rate 310 57.35% 59.44% 53.11% 1.45% 296.92%a
Clues trans. to judicial organs 310 22.81 25.72 14 0 168
Clues trans. to supervisory dep. 217 39.87 62.26 25 0 707
Clues trans. to related dep. 217 30.55 33.93 25 0 200
Cases ﬁled by jud. organs among clues trans. by audit ins. 185 8.86 8.89 7 0 61
Total cases ﬁled by pro. 301 1212 813 1163 29 4068
Panel C – other related information
Reports and news. delivered 254 3344.72 2619.27 2499 28 10,991
Reports and news. adopted 258 1664.22 1555.02 1110 7 7815
Adoption rate 257 46.47% 14.91% 46.09% 8.07% 92.46%
Number of employees 299 189.43 94.08 166 50 594
Audit employees/public oﬃcials 299 7.59 6.59 4.98 1.47 33.28
a There are 12 observations that are over 100%, which may be due to two reasons: ﬁrst, the auditees may turn over or return more than
asked for if they ﬁnd more malpractices in the self-checking process after audit; second, they may turn over or return funds that should
have been turned or returned in previous years but were delayed until the observed year.
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respectively, and less than nine clues transferred to the judicial organs are ﬁled per province-year on average.
The median rate of cases and clues ﬁled is 48.45%, which is not far from the 42.5% reported by Huang and
Wang (2010).5 In addition, there are about 1212 cases relating to corrupt acts ﬁled by the local procuratorial
organs in each province every year. Of these, clues transferred by local audit institutions represent only a small
proportion. In view of these descriptive statistics, it may be reasonable to infer that the power of the govern-
ment audit institution and its deterrent eﬀect lie mainly in the imposition of administrative sanctions and pen-
alties, rather than the transfer of clues.
Panel C of Table 2 summarizes the auditing reports and newsletters delivered by local audit institutions and
how these reports and newsletters are adopted by leading government oﬃcials and related departments.
Unfortunately, there is some missing data, but the information in Panel C may still be informative. As the
table shows, an average of 3245 auditing reports and newsletters are delivered by the audit institutions per
province-year. Of these, 1644 are instructed or accepted by the higher audit institutions, leading government
oﬃcials and other concerned departments, thus the average adoption rate is about 46.47%. The human
resources and ﬁnancial resources put into government auditing are also very important. However, because
the detailed recruitment and budget information of audit institutions at municipal and county levels is unavail-
able, we use the number of employees in the provincial audit oﬃce as a proxy. The average number of auditors
in a provincial audit oﬃce is 189. The number of employees varies widely between provinces. For instance, the
minimum number of employees in the Xin Jiang audit oﬃce in 1999 is 50 and the maximum number in the
Beijing audit oﬃce in 2007 is 594. When compared with the overall number of public oﬃcials, we ﬁnd that,
for each 10 thousand public oﬃcials, there are less than 8 government auditors, on average.5 The sample period of Huang and Wang (2010) is from 2002 to 2006.
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degree of corruption are used. One is the corruption cases ﬁled by the procuratorial organs (adjusted by pop-
ulation size, cases per 10,000 residents) and the other is the corruption perceptions index (CPI) scores evalu-
ated by Transparency International (a higher score indicates more transparency and less corruption).
Transparency International is a global civil society organization leading the ﬁght against corruption and
the CPI is one of the most authoritative corruption measurements in cross-country studies. Fig. 1 shows a
slight decrease in corruption cases ﬁled from 1999 to 2008. The CPI scores demonstrate a slight increase in
the same period, which also indicates a small decrease in corruption. In other words, Fig. 1 suggests a signif-
icantly negative correlation between the amount of corruption cases ﬁled and the CPI scores, and the trends in
these two measures are consistent. Therefore, corruption cases ﬁled may be a reasonable and feasible proxy for
local government corruption (as local level CPI is unavailable).
Fig. 2 describes the time trend for irregularities found in government auditing, clues transferred to the judi-
cial organs after audit and corruption cases ﬁled by the local procuratorial organs. Fig. 2a shows the time
trend for the number of irregularities per auditee, irregularities per capita and corruption cases ﬁled per
10,000 residents. As the ﬁgure shows, the number of irregularities per auditee and per capita both present a
signiﬁcant increasing trend, whereas the number of corruption cases ﬁled per 10,000 residents shows a slightly
decreasing trend in the sample period. We provide two explanations. First, the increase in the number of irreg-
ularities is consistent with the growth in the whole economy and the government total revenue and expendi-
ture, thus the total audited amount is increasing. Meanwhile, the scope of auditing has expanded and perhaps
the detection eﬀort has also increased as China’s government auditing has drawn increasing attention in recent
years. Second, the slight decrease in the number of corruption cases ﬁled indicates a slight decrease in corrup-
tion in the sample period, which is consistent with the Transparency International’s CPI scores for China
(Fig. 1). This conﬁrms, to some extent, that as the market development and legalization process continues
and the government places more emphasis on government governance, China has achieved a certain level
of success in the ﬁght against corruption in recent years. Fig. 2b shows a decrease in corruption clues trans-
ferred by audit institutions to the judicial organs, which is consistent with the decrease in the overall number of
corruption cases ﬁled by the procuratorial organs. This also indicates a decrease in severe violations in the
public ﬁnance sector, which may be attributable to the eﬀective implementation of government audits in recent
years. The audit storm and the subsequent institutional rectiﬁcations not only exposed the dark side of gov-
ernment operations to the public, but also pushed the government to make improvements and increase
transparency.
Fig. 3 describes the cross-sectional diﬀerences in the number of irregularities detected and corruption cases
ﬁled across provinces during the sample period. Fig. 3a summarizes the raw data and Fig. 3b uses data0
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China, codes 13–21 the nine provinces in the center and codes 22–31 the ten provinces in the west. As shown
in Fig. 3, the number of irregularities in accounts and corruption cases ﬁled varies signiﬁcantly across prov-
inces. Comparing the three regions, we ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcantly more irregularities and corruption cases
in the east and central regions than in the western region (Fig. 3a). However, the regional diﬀerences diminish
after adjusting for population size (Fig. 3b). We also note that more irregularities tend to be detected in prov-
inces with more corruption cases, though the positive correlation is not particularly signiﬁcant when the two
amounts are adjusted by population size.
4.3. Variable deﬁnitions
This study examines the relationships between the severity of corruption and audit institutions’ eﬀort in
detecting irregularities, and also between the post-audit rectiﬁcation eﬀort and the severity of corruption at
the provincial level. Following Zhou and Tao (2009) and Wu and Rui (2010), we use cases committed by pub-
lic oﬃcials and ﬁled by the judicial organs to measure the severity of corruption in a province and construct a
model of the determinants of corruption. Following Huang and Wang (2010) and Li et al. (2011), we apply
irregularities found in auditing rectiﬁcation results after an audit to measure the two aspects of government
auditing and construct models of the factors that determine the detection and rectiﬁcation of irregularities.
Sections 5 and 6 provide details of the model design. Table 3 summarizes the deﬁnitions of the variables used
in the regression models.
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5.1. Correlations
The previous analysis suggests that government auditing can detect and discover corrupt acts. In Section 4,
we show that the number of corruption cases ﬁled by the procuratorates is signiﬁcantly related to the CPI
scores provided by Transparency International. Some researchers have applied this number as a proxy for
the degree of corruption in province-level studies (Zhou and Tao, 2009; Wu and Rui, 2010). It is noted that
corruption cases always involve severe violations of public ﬁnance laws and regulations, and corrupt bureau-
cracies always have severe economic problems that should be noticed by government auditors. In a province
with severe corruption, there must be more misbehavior in government operations. When auditors are diligent
and responsible, more irregularities will be found and reported.
Fig. 4. describes the relationship between audit detection eﬀort and the degree of local corruption by scat-
tering all of the observations in the sample period. Fig. 4a uses the amount of irregularities per capita for audit
Table 3
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Corrupt Corruption, measured by cases of corruption ﬁled by the procuratorial organs in each province, adjusted by population size
(cases per 10,000 residents)
Au irrp Fraud detection eﬀort, measured by the log of irregularities detected by government audit institutions in each province,
adjusted by population size (yuan per capita, log transformed)
Au irru An alternative measure of fraud detection eﬀort, measured by the log of irregularities detected by government audit
institutions in each province, adjusted by the number of audited units (10,000 yuan per unit, log transformed)
Au recp Rectiﬁcation eﬀort, measured by whether the rectiﬁcation result is in accordance with audit sanctions and penalties.
Speciﬁcally, the amount of funds turned into the Treasury, returned to the original channel and the amount of relief and
grants cut oﬀ after audit, adjusted by population size (yuan per capita, log transformed)
Au recu An alternative measure of rectiﬁcation eﬀort, the same as Au recp, but adjusted by the number of audited units (10,000 yuan
per unit, log transformed)
Rptcyl The adoption rate of reports and newsletters delivered by local audit institutions, measured by reports and newsletters
accepted or instructed by leading government oﬃcials, CNAO and related government departments, adjusted by the
number of reports and newsletters delivered
Auditor Auditor, measured by the number of employees in the provincial audit bureau, adjusted by the number of public oﬃcials in
that province
Amount The amount of money audited by local audit institutions, using the total public ﬁnancial revenue and expenditure as a
proxy, adjusted by population size (yuan per capita, log transformed)
Growth Economic growth, measured by provincial GDP growth calculated by comparative price
Educ Education, measured by the average years of education over the age of 6
Wage Relative wage of public oﬃcials, measured by the average wage of employees in public administration and social
organizations, adjusted by the nominal GDP per capita of each province
Govsize Government size, measured by government ﬁnal consumption, adjusted by the GDP of each province
Open Openness, measured by the total amount of imports and exports, adjusted by the GDP of each province
Market Market development, measured by the number of employees of private enterprises, adjusted by the total number of
employees in each province
Revp Financial revenue, adjusted by the population size of each province
Deﬁcit Deﬁcit, measured by the expenditure revenue ratio of each province
Year Year dummies
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correlation between the number of irregularities and the number of corruption cases ﬁled.5.2. Multivariate models
According to the theoretical analysis and prediction in Section 3, the number of irregularities in public
ﬁnancial revenue and expenditure detected by local audit institutions will be signiﬁcantly related to the degree
of corruption in that province. However, there may be reverse causality between audit fraud detection eﬀort
and the degree of bureaucrats’ corruption. On the one hand, there are always more severe deﬁciencies in gov-
ernment operations and adminstration in a more corrupt place, thus the audit institutions will put more eﬀort
into detecting misbehavior. On the other hand, the exposure of misbehavior by audit institutions may also put
pressure on present or potential corrupt bureaucrats and force the audited bodies to improve their manage-
ment, thus reducing corruption in the lagged period (Li et al., 2011). In addition, several other factors may
aﬀect audit detection eﬀort, such as the audited scope and amount (Amount), the number of auditors (Audi-
tor), the adoption rate of audit reports and newsletters (Rptcyl), market development (Market) and openness
(Open). Among these,Market and Open also aﬀect the degree of local corruption. Education (Educ), economic
growth (Growth), compensation of public oﬃcials (Wage) and government size (Govsize) are also controlled as
determinants of corruption. Therefore, we use the following simultaneous equations to test the relationship
between audit detection eﬀort and bureacrats’ corruption.Au irri;t ¼ a0 þ a1Corrupti;t þ a2Auditori;t þ a3Rptcyli;t þ a4Amounti;t þ a5Openi;t þ a6Marketi;t
þ
X
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Fig. 4. Correlation between audit detection eﬀort and the degree of local corruption (1999–2008).
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þ b7Marketi;t þ
X
year þ eit ð1bÞThe subscript i denotes the code for each province and t denotes the sample year. Au irr is the log of irreg-
ularities detected by government audit institutions in each province, adjusted by population size (irregularities
per capita, Au irrp) or adjusted by the number of audited units (irregularities per unit, Au irru). Corrupt is the
degree of bureaucratic corruption in each province, measured by the number of corruption cases per 10,000
residents ﬁled by local procuratorial organs in each province, following Wu and Rui (2010). The variable def-
initions are listed in Table 3 and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.
5.3. Empirical results
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the main variables in the regression analysis (including the vari-
ables used in the next section). Table 5 reports the regression results for the simultaneous Eqs. (1a) and (1b);
Part I uses Au irrp as the independent variable in Model (1a), and Part II uses Au irru. As the table shows, the
detection eﬀort (Au irrp and Au irru) of audit institutions is signiﬁcantly positively related to the degree of
bureaucratic corruption (Corrupt) at the provincial level, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Meanwhile,
the adoption rate of audit reports and newsletters and the amount of funds audited both exert a signiﬁcant
Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Au irrpi;t 247 4.99 0.85 4.98 2.12 6.81
Au irrui;t 247 4.92 0.95 4.98 1.58 7.45
Corrupti;t 247 0.30 0.10 0.29 0.07 0.70
Au irrpi;t1 247 4.86 0.89 4.87 2.12 6.82
Au irrui;t1 247 4.78 1.03 4.87 1.57 7.45
Rptcyl 247 0.47 0.15 0.47 0.08 0.92
Auditor 247 7.65 6.51 5.00 1.48 33.28
Amount 247 7.97 0.72 7.89 6.62 10.17
Educ 247 7.92 1.09 7.98 3.74 11.09
Wage 247 1.57 0.65 1.45 0.34 4.43
Govsize 247 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.96
Open 247 0.34 0.43 0.12 0.04 1.72
Market 247 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.29
Au corpi;t 247 3.00 0.90 2.99 0.51 5.45
Au corui;t 247 2.93 0.99 2.98 0.16 5.77
Au corpi;t1 247 2.83 0.90 2.87 0.51 5.21
Au corui;t1 247 2.75 0.99 2.86 0.16 5.70
Revp 247 6.79 0.82 6.66 5.49 9.43
Deﬁcit 247 2.52 2.15 2.20 1.05 17.90
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and openness are negatively related to irregularities found in government auditing. This is understandable
because provinces that are more open and have good market development tend to have more transparent gov-
ernment and less misbehavior among bureaucrats. The regression results for the corruption equation indicate
that the degree of corruption in year t is positively related to irregularities detected in year t  1. There are
several explanations. First, the audit results of local audit institutions, especially at the municipal and county
levels, are not always disclosed to the general public (Song et al., 2009). Meanwhile, audit decisions—including
suggestions for sanctions, penalties and rectiﬁcation—are always against the audited bodies rather than indi-
viduals and these decisions are seldom fulﬁlled, which considerably reduces the deterrent power of government
auditing (Wei et al., 2010). Second, we use corruption cases ﬁled by the procuratorial organs to measure the
level of corruption, while audit institutions and procuratorial organs are cooperative in corruption investiga-
tions. More cases and clues may be transferred when auditors put more eﬀort into detection, and these clues
may be delayed to the lagged year and thus increase the number of corruption cases in the lagged year. Third,
corruption is a chronic problem, thus if the audit institutions only report and disclose the misbehavior and
relevant disposals within the government, it will not exert a strong deterrent eﬀect, nor will it reduce
corruption.
Table 5 also shows that the relative compensation of public oﬃcials and the level of openness are negatively
related to corruption, which is also consistent with Wu and Rui (2010). However, the education variable is
negatively related to corruption, which is against our expectation. As there may be strong correlations among
the dependent variables, we regress corrupt on education separately, but still ﬁnd that they are positively
related. Two implications may be inferred from this ﬁnding. First, we need to improve the measurement of
education, because although the ﬂow of human resources across provinces in China is very common, the edu-
cation measure is calculated from household registration data. Second, as shown in Table 4, the average edu-
cation level in China is only 7.92 years and there is little variation in the sample, thus the incremental need for
transparency caused by education may not prevail at present.
6. Post-audit rectiﬁcation and corruption
6.1. Correlations
The exposure of misbehavior detected in government auditing is not enough for audit institutions to play a
role in curbing corruption. The implementation of audit decisions and rectiﬁcations following audits are more
Table 5
Irregularities detected in government auditing and corruption.
Variables Expected sign I II
Au irrp Corrupt Au irru Corrupt
Cons. 4.387*** 0.066 3.480*** 0.193**
(3.23) (0.68) (2.77) (2.04)
Corrupt + 5.540*** 3.165***
(6.62) (3.72)
Au irrpi;t1 ? 0.038
***
(5.45)
Au irrui;t1 ? 0.019***
(2.90)
Rptcyl + 0.985*** 1.871***
(3.63) (6.03)
Auditor + 0.001 0.002
(0.13) (0.22)
Amount + 0.946*** 0.782***
(5.72) (4.34)
Growth – 0.000 0.001
(0.07) (0.36)
Educ ? 0.014* 0.029***
(1.71) (3.04)
Wage – 0.055*** 0.066***
(3.56) (4.06)
Govsize ? 0.041 0.168**
(0.57) (2.36)
Open – 0.445** 0.056*** 0.278 0.068***
(2.56) (3.02) (1.57) (3.50)
Market – 4.856*** 0.240 6.341*** 0.346**
(3.17) (1.49) (4.03) (2.12)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
N 247 247 247 247
Chi2 224.94 197.81 263.64 181.22
R2 0.350 0.381 0.490 0.397
Note: Z-values are in parentheses.
Au irrpi;t1 and Au irrui;t1 take the values of the observations in year t  1, while other variables take the values of the observations in
year t.
* Signiﬁcance at the 1%.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 10%.
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is only by punishing violations and rectifying wrongdoings that government audits can deter malfeasant oﬃ-
cials. Audit institutions are involved in the rectiﬁcation process in several ways. First, once violations and mis-
behavior are found, the audit institution must either take measures to deal with them directly, or transfer
severe cases to the people’s government and departments in charge and provide disposal suggestions. The
audit institution should also provide suggestions on how to improve and standardize the internal control
and ﬁnancial management of the auditee. Finally, the audit institution should perform checks on the imple-
mentation of all sanctions and penalties and the outcome of transferred cases and clues, and urge the audited
bodies to complete all of the treatment decisions and rectiﬁcation suggestions when they are reluctant to do so.
However, as indicated in the previous analysis, the registration rate of cases and clues transferred by audit
institutions is quite low, thus the implementation of sanctions and penalties imposed directly by the audit insti-
tutions may be the key to guaranteeing the power of the government audit system. Therefore, we use the
implementation of sanctions and penalties to measure rectiﬁcation eﬀort, and examine its inﬂuence on
corruption.
The scatter plot in Fig. 5 describes the relationship between the degree of corruption in year t (Corrupti,t)
and the rectiﬁcation results after an audit in year t  1 (Au reci;t1). Fig. 5a applies the rectiﬁcation amount per
J. Liu, B. Lin / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 163–186 181capita (Au recpi;t1) and Fig. 5b applies the rectiﬁcation amount per audited unit (Au recui;t1). From the ﬁg-
ure, a primary negative correlation between audit rectiﬁcation eﬀort and the degree of corruption in the lagged
year can be inferred.
6.2. Multivariate models
According to previous analysis, on the one hand, rectiﬁcation is the implementation of sanctions, penalties
and suggestions imposed by audit institutions. Only when all sanctions, penalties and suggestions are carried
out can economic and ﬁnancial order be maintained and the deterrent eﬀect of government auditing guaran-
teed. On the other hand, the rectiﬁcation process needs the support of leading local government oﬃcials and
the cooperation of related parties in addition to the eﬀort of the audit institution. Therefore, the more thor-
oughly the audit sanctions and penalties are implemented, the better the rectiﬁcation results will be, and the
audited bodies that are punished will be less likely to commit misbehavior in the future. At the same time, the
prevailing corruption may also hinder rectiﬁcation eﬀort. That is, rectiﬁcation may be even more diﬃcult to
enforce in more corrupt places. To capture the two-way relationship between audit rectiﬁcation and corrup-
tion, the following simultaneous equation models are empirically tested.Corrupti;t ¼ a0 þ a1Au reci;t1 þ a2Growthi;t þ a3Educi;t þ a4Wagei;t þ a5Govsizei;t þ a6Openi;t
þ a7Marketi;t þ
X
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Fig. 5. Correlation between audit rectiﬁcation eﬀort and the degree of local corruption (1999–2008).
Table
Post-a
Variab
Cons.
Au rec
Au rec
Corrup
Growth
Educ
Wage
Govsiz
Open
Marke
Rptcyl
Deﬁcit
Audito
Rev
Year
N
R2
Chi2
P-valu
Note:
* Sig
** Sig
*** Sig
182 J. Liu, B. Lin / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 163–186Au reci;t ¼ b0 þ b1Corrupti;t þ b2Auditori;t þ b3Rptcyli;t þ b4Revpi;t þ b5Deficiti;t þ b6Openi;t
þ b7Marketi;t þ
X
year þ git ð2bÞModel (2a) examines how audit rectiﬁcation eﬀort in year t  1 (Au reci;t1) aﬀect the degree of bureaucrats’
corruption in year t (Corrupti,t). Model (2b) tests whether corruption in year t (Corrupti;t) inﬂuences the audit
rectiﬁcation process in the same period (Au reci;t). Similar to the measurement of audit detection eﬀort, we use
the amount of rectiﬁcation per capita (Au recp) and per unit (Au recu) to proxy for audit rectiﬁcation eﬀort.
The variable deﬁnitions are presented in Table 3 and descriptive statistics are in Table 4. The regression results
are reported in Table 6.6.3. Empirical results
Table 6 reports the regression results for Models (2a) and (2b); Part I uses rectiﬁcation per capita (Au recp)
as the measure of rectiﬁcation eﬀort, whereas Part II uses rectiﬁcation per units (Au recu). As shown in the6
udit rectiﬁcation and corruption.
les Expected sign I II
Corrupt Au recp Corrupt Au recu
? 0.219** 3.247*** 0.251*** 2.558**
(2.26) (2.91) (3.01) (2.33)
pi;t1 – 0.020***
(2.94)
ui;t1 - 0.034***
(5.91)
t ? 2.182* 4.691***
(1.78) (3.80)
– 0.002 0.001
(0.53) (0.59)
? 0.041*** 0.039***
(4.43) (4.76)
– 0.071*** 0.065***
(4.23) (4.44)
e + 0.244*** 0.192***
(3.48) (2.86)
? 0.983*** 0.594** 0.024 0.299
(3.60) (2.22) (1.29) (1.08)
t ? 3.888** 1.165 0.405** 5.728***
(2.20) (0.65) (2.56) (3.09)
+ 0.626* 1.289***
(1.95) (4.24)
– 0.058** 0.079***
(2.06) (2.76)
r + 0.005 0.001
(0.52) (0.10)
+ 1.071*** 1.029***
(4.63) (4.60)
Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
247 247 247 247
0.408 0.419 0.398 0.463
183.45 191.31 205.56 258.91
e 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Z-values are in parentheses.
niﬁcance at the 1%.
niﬁcance at the 5%.
niﬁcance at the 10%.
J. Liu, B. Lin / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 163–186 183table, the coeﬃcients of Au recpi;t1 and Au recui;t1 are both signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that after con-
trolling for other factors, the more eﬀort put into rectiﬁcation at present, the less corruption there will be in the
following period, which is consistent with our Hypothesis 2. Meanwhile, concerning the reverse inﬂuence of
corruption on audit rectiﬁcation, the regression results of Model (2b) also show that more corrupt places tend
to have worse rectiﬁcation results (the coeﬃcients of Corrupt are signiﬁcantly negative in both Column 4 and
Column 6). In addition, the coeﬃcients of Wage, Govsize, Open, Market Rptcyl, Deﬁcit and Auditor are all
consistent with our predictions. Provinces that have higher relative compensation for public oﬃcials, have
smaller local governments, are more open in international trade and have better market development tend
to be less corrupt. Better rectiﬁcation results are also achieved in provinces with better ﬁnancial status (higher
revenue and low deﬁcit) and when audit reports and other audit information are valued by leading govern-
ment oﬃcials, the audited departments and other related parties.6.4. Further analysis
We have examined the relationships between audit detection eﬀort and corruption and between audit rec-
tiﬁcation and corruption separately. Through these tests and analysis we have learnt two things: ﬁrst, the
detection eﬀort of government auditing is positively related to the degree of corruption—that is, local audit
institutions tend to ﬁnd more irregularities in more corrupt places; and second, the degree of corruption is
negatively related to audit rectiﬁcation eﬀort in the previous period—that is, thorough rectiﬁcation after an
audit can help to reduce corruption. To capture the interactions between the three factors—audit detection
eﬀort, audit rectiﬁcation and corruption—we construct the following simultaneous equation models.Table
Regres
Variab
Cons.
Au irrp
Au rec
Corrup
Growth
Educ
Wage
Govsiz
Open
Marke
Rptcyl
Audito
Amou
Deﬁcit
Rev
Year
N
R2
Chi2
P-valu
Note: T
Au irrp
* Sig
** Sig
*** SigAu irrpi;t ¼ r0 þ r1Corrupti;t þ r2Auditori;t þ r3Rptcyli;t þ r4Amounti;t þ r5Openi;t þ r6Marketi;t
þ
X
year þ kit ð3aÞ7
sion results of simultaneous equations for detection of irregularities, rectiﬁcation and corruption.
les Corruption Irregularities Rectiﬁcation
Coef. Z-value Coef. Z-value Coef. Z-value
0.198** (2.49) 5.41*** (4.72) 3.388** (3.11)
i;t1 0.043
*** (6.09)
pi;t1 0.025*** (4.18)
t 5.701*** (7.22) 1.927* (1.71)
0.001 (0.18)
0.020** (2.49)
0.064*** (4.47)
e 0.024 (0.34)
0.053*** (2.91) 0.469*** (2.71) 0.980*** (3.80)
t 0.228 (1.42) 5.21*** (3.42) 3.928** (2.29)
1.092*** (4.00) 0.667** (2.09)
r 0.001 (0.17) 0.005 (0.53)
nt 1.021*** (6.20)
0.056** (2.08)
1.076 (4.90)
Controlled Controlled Controlled
247 247 247
0.400 0.341 0.425
199.50 243.92 201.85
e 0.000 0.000 0.000
he independent variables in the corruption equation, detection of irregularities equation and rectiﬁcation equation are Corrupti,t,
i;t, and Au corpi;t respectively.
niﬁcance at the 1%.
niﬁcance at the 5%.
niﬁcance at the 10%.
184 J. Liu, B. Lin / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 163–186Corrupti;t ¼ d0 þ d1Au irrpi;t1 þ d2Au recpi;t1 þ d3Growthi;t þ d4Educi;t þ d5Wagei;t
þ d6Govsizei;t þ d7Openi;t þ d8Marketi;t þ
X
year þ sit ð3bÞ
Au recpi;t ¼ h0 þ h1Corrupti;t þ h2Au irrpi;t þ h3Auditori;t þ h4Rptcyli;t þ h5Revpi;t þ h6Deficiti;t
þ h7Openi;t þ h8Marketi;t þ
X
year þ mit ð3cÞModel (3a) is exactly the same as Model (1a). Model (3b) is based on Model (1b) but adds Au recpi;t1 as
another determinant of Corrupti;t, as it was signiﬁcant in Table 6.Model (3c) is the same asModel (2b). The vari-
ables are deﬁned in Table 3 and descriptive statistics are in Table 4. The regression results are stated in Table 7.
As shown in Table 7, the coeﬃcient of Au irrpi;t1 in Model (3a) remains signiﬁcantly positive and the coef-
ﬁcient of Au recpi;t1 remains signiﬁcantly negative, which are consistent with previous ﬁndings. These results
again demonstrate that local audit institutions are diligent in detecting irregularities, thus more irregularities
tend to be found in more corrupt places. Furthermore, rectiﬁcation eﬀort after an audit can strengthen the
eﬀectiveness of government auditing and help to reduce corruption in the future.7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the role that government auditing plays in the ﬁght against corruption. Using a sam-
ple of provincial data from China from 1999 to 2008, we construct simultaneous equation models to examine
the interactions among audit detection, audit rectiﬁcation and bureaucratic corruption at the local level. Our
research indicates that local audit institutions can detect misbehavior and violations in public ﬁnancial reve-
nues and expenditures and make corresponding decisions to rectify these problems. However, not all sanc-
tions, penalties and suggestions proposed by audit institutions are fulﬁlled. The empirical results also
indicate that rectiﬁcation eﬀort after an audit can strengthen the eﬀectiveness of government auditing. That
is, the level of corruption can be reduced more eﬀectively in places where rectiﬁcation activities are carried
out more thoroughly.
This paper also provides some far-reaching implications for China’s government auditing practices and cor-
ruption control initiatives. Our research indicates that rectiﬁcation after an audit is even more important than
the fraud detection process itself. Whereas the discovery of irregularities without subsequent disposals cannot
make government auditing a powerful accountability regime, rectiﬁcation that includes “asking for responsi-
bility” is eﬀective in reducing corruption. Therefore, leading government oﬃcials, audit institutions and other
professional supervisory agencies should place greater emphasis on the rectiﬁcation process after audits. They
should ensure not only that all lawful sanctions and penalties imposed by government auditors are exercised
thoroughly, but also that institutional problems found in auditing are solved in a timely manner. It is only by
correcting misbehavior found in government auditing and punishing all of the responsible departments and
individuals for their wrongdoing, that government transparency can be achieved and the chronic corruption
problem can be genuinely relieved.
There are two limitations of this study that must be acknowledged. First, auditors’ independence, compe-
tence and the quality control of the auditing process may all aﬀect an audit institution’s performance, but due
to data availability we did not include these factors in our regression. Second, although the deterrent eﬀect of
government auditing may arise from several aspects, such as the public exposure of irregularities and respon-
sible oﬃcers, lawful punishment of severe economic crimes, political demotion and other administrative pun-
ishments, we focus only on the implementation of sanctions and penalties. Thus, our results should be
interpreted with caution. However, the limitations of this paper can also be overcome as China’s government
auditing practices are further standardized and perfected and more data becomes available. Therefore, this
paper also leaves much room for future research.Acknowledgements
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